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Introduction 
The Commission’s flagship initiative of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) aims to unlock funding for 
capital markets and find ways of linking investors and savers with growth. A number of very disparate 
measures will, it is hoped, have a cumulative but significant impact on the creation of a single market 
for capital. By the end of 2017, the Commission expects to have finalised and implemented the first 
phase of CMU measures. Some of these important measures include: an EU framework for simple, 
transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation; prospectus rules that facilitate access to capital 
markets and generate more, but less costly, financing opportunities; and improvements to the current 
venture capital and social entrepreneurship regulations (EuVECA/EuSEF).1  
Given the Commission’s priority to accelerate CMU, much more remains to be done. This year will be 
an exciting and intense one for prospective regulation, which will lead to the second phase of CMU 
actions. For example, in 2017 we expect more work on: business insolvency (early restructuring and 
second chance); preferential tax treatment of debt over equity; capital charges to infrastructure 
companies (Solvency II); and favourable loan enforcement regimes to SMEs (Capital Requirements 
Regulation and Directive). This is not enough, however. Further priorities such as the development of 
a personal pensions framework, an action plan on retail financial services, the development of a 
comprehensive European strategy on sustainable finance and the development of a coordinated 
policy approach that supports FinTech are all vital for a successful CMU. 
This Commentary attempts to highlight the inefficiencies of the current CMU Action Plan.   
                                                          
This Commentary is a contribution to the public consultation on the Capital Markets Union mid-term review, 2017. 
1
 See the Commission’s Communication of 14 September 2016 for a rapid completion of the first measures 
proposed under the Action Plan here: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/20160913-cmu-
accelerating-reform_en.pdf.  
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Existing inefficiencies 
Key drivers of the CMU 
CMU was motivated by a desire to: tackle the obstacles to growth and job creation, fill the hole that 
banks left behind in the financing arena (overreliance on the banking sector was akin to placing all 
one’s eggs in a basket), and to make the EU financial system more resilient to future crises (shock-
proof). So far, however, these three main drivers of the CMU have not been accompanied by vitalised 
structural measures that could accelerate the pace of capital market integration in Europe.  
1. Growth and jobs: Even though they are the cornerstone of the CMU, the initiative does not contain 
any policy instrument that directly impacts GDP or employment. Europe has gone through a severe 
financial and economic crisis, with much of the region still struggling to make meaningful headway on 
reducing unemployment and stimulating economic growth. Macroeconomic policies across the EU 
remain biased towards austerity and do not adequately complement the expansionary monetary 
policy of the ECB and other NCBs (prosperous north vs poor south). While northern countries can 
expand aggregate demand by increasing public investment and reducing taxes, southern countries’ 
macroeconomic expansion is hindered by past debts, weak banking systems and economic 
uncertainty. 
Proposals such as a joint eurozone/EU issuance of bonds, which could probably enhance a fiscal 
stabilisation mechanism, improve the through-the-cycle resilience of the eurozone, provide capital 
markets with a liquid risk-free asset, support the diversification of European banks’ balance sheets, 
and create cross-border banking groups, remain rather vague. Such proposals fail on legal, political, 
and economic grounds2 and will always be postponed as long as Germany and other northern 
countries view them as an attempt to share fiscal misgovernance and structural reforms avoidance by 
southern countries. Political consensus plays an important role here and there is certainly nothing like 
that in Europe right now. 
2. Bank dependency: The EU financial system is bank-driven and dominated by large, universal banks. 
The financial crisis showed us that EU would greatly benefit from rebalancing its economic structures 
towards a more market-based finance. The CMU should help this rebalancing process by integrating 
nationally fragmented capital markets. The STS securitisation is a step in the right direction, as well as 
the streamlining of rules for securities prospectuses and the simplification of market entry. However, 
more effort has to be made to support start-ups/SMEs, to reduce access barriers to public trading 
platforms and develop venture capital, private financing and crowdfunding. In addition, the CMU 
needs to attract and incorporate more actively household and corporate-sector savings in vehicles 
that will invest in capital markets and encourage them to diversify across the EU.  
In order for the CMU to reach its main aim, to facilitate capital market development by reducing the 
dependency of EU economies on banks, more initiatives towards the imposition of legal restrictions on 
banking sector are necessary. These restrictions will encourage innovations that expand the role of 
capital markets at the expense of banks. We can find examples of such restrictions when looking at 
the US and the UK. For example, the restriction of deposit-taking banks from engaging in certain types 
                                                          
2
 See Gros (2011). 
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of market-oriented activity,3 the ring-fencing of retail bank operations into separate legal subsidiaries4 
(UK Independent Commission on Banking, ICB), and the imposition of size limits aim at dampening the 
impact of a failure (Section 622 of the Dodd Frank Act).  
3. Shock absorption: More integrated capital markets (through CMU) are expected to provide 
additional shock absorption capacity by increasing private-sector risk sharing, lowering economic 
volatility via geographic diversification of equities and bonds, enabling households and firms to 
lend/borrow from other economies (less impacted by given crisis), involving a more diverse investor 
base with different funding profiles and risk appetites.5 
To achieve this, national differences in supervisory, regulatory, tax, and legal practices, need to be 
eliminated. The Commission currently works in this direction, by focusing on standardising cross-
border clearing and settlement infrastructures; by formulating principles-based legislation on business 
insolvency and early restructuring; and by establishing a code of conduct for withholding-tax-relief 
principles and tax-induced disadvantages for equity financing.  
However, these reforms largely depend on the progress of related initiatives such as harmonising 
accounting and auditing and increasing the role of the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), which oversees consistent enforcement of EU rules in all 28 member states. While the CMU 
can help expand risk-sharing through capital markets, the adjustment to asymmetric shocks in the 
eurozone will further require some additional element of fiscal union, such as a joint Eurobond, 
cyclical adjustment fund, or common unemployment insurance.  
Other key areas that need to be speeded up 
Further areas that require attention in CMU discussions are post-trade infrastructure, online services 
and FinTech, crowdfunding, loan-originating funds, and cross-border distribution of funds. These areas 
are important for unlocking funding for capital markets and finding ways to linking investors and 
savers with growth.   
4. Post-trade infrastructure: Although another keystone of the CMU project, developing an EU-wide 
capital market by bringing down national barriers, is not new.6 Creating more efficient capital markets 
                                                          
3
 For example, proprietary trading, or other types of activities that were deemed by the US Congress to be 
incompatible as a policy matter with the appropriate risk profile and customer-driven mission of banking 
entities. However, looking at the US, one challenge in implementing the Volcker Rule is complying with the 
market-making exemption to the prohibition on proprietary trading. The ambiguity as to what is legal market-
making and what is prohibited proprietary trading may push dealers covered by the Volcker Rule toward more 
conservative trading strategies, leading to less liquid markets. While some would argue that dealers not affected 
by the Volcker Rule will step in to provide liquidity, recent empirical evidence (Bao et al., 2016) finds that the net 
effect is a less liquid market. 
4
 These subsidiaries should be governed by their own prudential safeguards.   
5
 See the speech by Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem at the Tatra Summit in Bratislava, 4, November 
2015 (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/04-jd-speech-tatra-summit/) and Alcidi and 
Thirion (2016). 
6
 In fact, the free flow of capital was one of the fundamental principles on which the EU was built, and this idea 
has fed into many EU initiatives and projects. These undertakings ranged from the 1988 deregulation of capital 
movements in the EU (European Commission, 1989) to the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan, to the proposals 
set forth by the Giovannini Group (from 2001) for removing obstacles to the cross-border clearing and 
settlement of securities transactions. 
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was cited as an explicit goal of monetary union. The CMU is a further step towards the completion of a 
single European capital market. Within this scope, one of Commission’s priorities is to remove barriers 
in the post-trading environment. Efficient and safe post-trade infrastructures are key elements of well-
functioning capital markets.  
Even after initiatives including the adoption in 2014 of a new EU Regulation on Central Securities 
Depositories7 and the creation by the European Central Bank of the Target2-Securities (T2S) platform8 
for securities settlements, many of the Giovannini barriers9 remain. As identified in the Giovannini 
reports,10 the EU should aim to reduce or eliminate the current difference between cross-border 
securities transactions and transactions within a single EU country.  
More efficient settlement of transactions and processing would occur as everyone would see the 
same data and updates would be circulated quickly across the market. Cash transactions could settle 
in (near) real-time since the trade is complete when the next update to the blockchain is agreed, 
embedding the transfer of ownership of an asset or other agreement. This would remove the need for 
post-trade affirmation or confirmation and central clearing during the settlement cycle (which has in 
some cases been shortened to minutes or even seconds). Since all participants would now use the 
same underlying dataset for trade-related processes, the blockchain would reduce the scope for data 
errors, disputes and reconciliation lags, which would speed up the end-to-end process. 
Currently, an expert group (European Post-Trade Forum, EPTF) has been established to assess the 
evolution of the EU post-trade landscape following recent legislative changes, market developments 
and the emergence of new technologies. The group will also assess the extent to which the Giovannini 
barriers have been removed and identify any new or emerging barriers. In parallel, the Commission 
will propose a future legislative initiative to determine with legal certainty which national law will 
apply to security ownership and to third party effects of the assignment of claims. 
5. Online services and FinTech: In order to promote the FinTech sector, the Commission needs to 
ensure that the regulatory environment strikes the right balance between enabling the development 
of FinTech and ensuring confidence and protection for investors.11 Retail investors currently receive 
limited rewards for assuming the high risks associated with market based investments, because of 
large intermediation and distribution fees. MiFID II (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive), PRIIPs 
(Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products) and IDD (Insurance Distribution Directive) 
are expected to change the landscape governing investment advice and product disclosure and 
enforce investors’ confidence in capital markets.  
                                                          
7
 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0909&from=en.  
8
 See www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/html/index.en.html.  
9
 See www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/about/html/giovannini.en.html.  
10
 The first Giovannini Group (2001) report identified 15 barriers which were preventing efficient cross-border 
clearing and settlement of securities in the EU, while the second Giovannini Group (2003) report addressed the 
actions to be undertaken to eliminate the problems identified in the first report.  
11
 The Commission set up an internal task force (Financial Technology Task Force, FTTF), which brings together 
services responsible for financial regulation, for the Digital Single Market, competition and for a consumer 
protection policy. With the engagement of outside experts and stakeholders, the Commission aims at 
formulating policy-oriented recommendations and propose measures in the course of 2017. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-single-market.    
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The move towards the ‘online distribution’ of investment products, as well as the new FinTech 
ecosystem, undeniably represent a huge opportunity to develop further advisory services and open-
access online distribution platforms. But for these changes to be successful, they should be 
accompanied by a critical and comprehensive assessment of the investment solutions and by 
outcomes proposed to retail investors. Initiatives such as the Smarter Consumer Communications,12 
which changes the way information is communicated and delivered to customers, and the Regulatory 
Sandbox,13 which allows businesses to test innovative products, services, business models and delivery 
mechanisms in a live environment, could set a great example. 
6. Crowdfunding: Despite the expansion of funding sources available to SMEs (especially non-bank 
funding via private equity and peer-to-peer investment and borrowing), securities-based 
crowdfunding and peer-to-peer business lending still represent a small share of SME’s funding. A 
number of reasons for this are i) a non-harmonised legislation on crowdfunding across member states, 
ii) a lack of credit information about SMEs14 which narrows access to crowdfunding, as well as to other 
funding sources, iii) a lack of information/knowledge and awareness of securities based on 
crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending amongst investors. 
This being said, it should be noted that the Commission is taking steps towards assessing national 
regimes and best practice and monitoring the evolution of the crowdfunding sector. However, the 
current fragmentation and local dimension of these activities will certainly benefit from the MiFID II 
passport or initiatives that aim to develop the cross-border crowdfunding business and harmonise 
existing EU legislation with existing and upcoming national regulatory frameworks.15   
7. Loan-originating funds: Loan-originating funds can play an important role and be a useful source of 
non-bank credit. ESMA has issued an opinion on loan-originating funds in April 2016, with the scope to 
identify elements that should be part of a possible European framework on loan origination.16 
However, it is not clear whether this consultation will lead to a concrete legislative proposal for a 
Europe-wide regime for lending by funds, or whether it will lead to a review of the current market 
landscape. It is also unclear what will happen to non-EU fund structures and how, if at all, an EU 
legislative proposal would approach lending into the EU by such funds. 
The Action Plan identifies that EuVECAs (European Venture Capital Funds) and ELTIFs (European Long-
Term Investment Funds) can, to an extent, originate loans. This is aside from bespoke regimes that 
some member states (notably Ireland and Luxembourg) introduce into their national frameworks to 
frame the conditional under which alternative investment funds can originate loans. The Commission 
needs to work to assess the need for a coordinated approach to loan origination by funds and the case 
for a future EU framework. 
8. Cross-border distribution of funds: Despite the fact that 80% of UCITS (Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities) and 40% of AIF (Alternative Investment Funds) are marketed 
                                                          
12
 See www.fca.org.uk/publications/discussion-papers/smarter-consumer-communications-further-step-journey. 
13
 See www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox. 
14
 See post-event report of ECMI Lunchtime Seminar on “Removing Information Barriers to Investment in SMEs”: 
www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/events/lunchtime-events/removing-information-barriers-investment-smes. 
15
 The European Crowdfunding Stakeholder Forum assists the Commission in developing policies for 
crowdfunding.  
16
 See ESMA (2016). 
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cross-border, the distribution of funds remain geographically limited.17 The success of the CMU largely 
depends on the removal of unjustified national barriers to the free movement of capital. Latest data 
reveal that a third of funds marketed cross-border are sold in only one other member state and 
another third in no more than four other member states. Some of the reasons for inefficiency are i) a 
concentrated fund distribution channels in individual member states; ii) cultural preferences and iii) a 
lack of incentives to compete across borders.      
For the Commission to ensure easier cross-border investments, a number of challenges have to be 
tackled. First, tax barriers, such as withholding tax procedures. Member states need to conclude a 
double-taxation agreement to avoid double taxation to investors. Second, divergences in corporate 
governance frameworks between member states, which may discourage investors from making cross-
border investments. Third, divergences in supervisory outcomes. ESMA should focus on achieving 
convergence of the supervisory frameworks and ensure a better financial integration within member 
states.18 Moreover, ESMA is determined to ensure adequate investor protection independently of the 
location of the firm providing the services.19   
Conclusion 
To conclude, the European Commission has to ensure that the key aim of the CMU and the Action 
Plan is to improve the capital markets themselves, rather than making it easier for large institutions to 
invest more and extend their product and services offers. The focus should be on increasing 
transparency, making capital markets more accessible to smaller businesses, incentivising long-term 
private investment in listed equities, encouraging the development and use of disruptive technology 
and, ultimately, creating jobs.  
This year will prove crucial for the successful implementation of the CMU Action Plan and the delivery 
of its full potential to support growth in Europe. Moreover, the impact that events such as Brexit, the 
French and German national elections will have on CMU, of course remains to be seen. The current 
environment of political instability and uncertainty mirrors the fact that the EU is at a crossroads, with 
decisive years ahead. It seems that the goal – the completion of CMU by 2019 – is moving backwards 
and farther away.  
  
                                                          
17
 See EC (2017). 
18
 See Demarigny (2015). 
19
 See ESMA (2017). 
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